Thoughts on Turkey and The New World Order

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The 1990's have brought the world a lot of commotion. The fall of most of the communist regimes around the world, the rediscovery of nationalism and religion, the strong trend of global economic integration and the increasingly fast spread of technology have changed the global political and economic scene quite substantially. It is interesting that the momentum for change has taken seemingly opposite directions in the political and economic domains. In economics, we have observed a wave of integration and ever-increasing interdependence while in politics the most visible features have been factionalism and disintegration. In fact, both the economic integration and the political disintegration phenomena are the consequences of the same underlying factor. The world is being swept by a wave of individualism and fragmentation. The nation-state is losing its prominence as the supreme sovereign body. Smaller functional units (regions, cities, communities, corporations or even individuals) are gaining independent decision making powers on different fronts. During this process, these smaller functional units leave their historical economic groupings and align themselves with new sets of partners in pursuit of efficiency and material profit maximization. In addition, they are breaking free of the accumulation of political and legal tradition left to them by the institutions of the sovereign states and are expressing their individual identity a lot more freely than before.

These major global economic and political trends are affecting Turkey directly. It is fair to say that Turkey has experienced more than its fair share of upheaval. This is primarily due to the fact that Turkey happens to be very close to several of the cracks and faultlines emerging from the political fragmentation of the world. The removal of the iron curtain opened up new opportunities as well as liabilities in the North. The roller-coaster developments in the European Community are forcing the Turkish people to make imprtant decisions about their relationship to the West. The rise of Islamic fundamentalist and ethnic nationalist movements are probing the Turkish psyche. The half-hearted interventionist policies of the United States in the Middle East have underscored Turkey's historical and cultural ties to the region. And finally, unexpected developments such as the Bosnian disaster and the Arab-Israeli peace have intensified the debates on chronic problems such as the Cyprus question or the Kurdish dilemma. The sweeping changes in the political and economic environment around Turkey have inevitably led to major tremors within the country.

What sort of role must Turkey play in the 'New World Order' (or disorder) that appeared in the 1990s? I think the answer to this question is very clear. Turkey should own up to her strong culture, history and heritage and play a leading political and economic role in the region. On the other hand, Turkey is obliged to put her house to order and realize her full potential in order to fulfill a meaningful international role. A key requirement for the resolution of Turkey's internal problems as well as the improvement of the role of Turkey in the region is a major paradigm shift. We have to work on our concept of national identity and rediscover pluralism, which can be defined in this context as the 'cohabitation and collaboration of alternative views'. Pluralism in the economic domain as well as the political arena will allow Turkey to overcome its internal conflicts and measure up to her full potential.

At the outset, it is worthwhile to remember that pluralism is not a new phenomenon in the lands that constitute the Turkish Republic now. Ethnic nationalism is a concept that was quite alien to the Turkish tradition. For centuries, people of Anatolia from different backgrounds coexisted peacefully under Hittite, Persian, Hellenistic, Roman, Arab, Byzantine, Seljuk and Ottoman rule. This is why Ataturk, unlike the Neo-Ottoman, Pan-Islamist or Unionists before him, attempted to formulate a Turkish identity independent of ethnic, religious and ideological characteristics.

It can be said that Turkish foreign policy in the last few hundred years has been very defensive and passive, with the exception of the Ataturk era. This condition was largely a result of the circumstances. First, the relative decline of the military power of the Ottoman Empire and the slow but steady disintegration of its internal political system gradually reduced the Turkish influence in regional affairs. After the foundation of the Republic, a brief reversal of this trend was observed, but after the Second World War, the bipolar structure of world politics significantly restricted Turkey's room to maneuver.

The 1990s have plunged Turkey into a completely different environment. The power vacuum left in the region by the Russian decline and the half-hearted American interest is forcing Turkey to take the initiative. In the days of the iron curtain, Turkey was effectively cut-off from its neighbors both economically and politically, leading to an inward-looking identity and a foreign policy limited to relations with the West. With the fall of Communism and the decline of the intensity of American interest in the region, the Turkish Republic suddenly found herself facing her neighbors again.

In facing this challenge, Turkey has some strong advantages as well as worrisome liabilities. The essential compenent of any active foreign policy is a strong economy and an internal consensus. National cohesion does not have to be achieved by homogenuity; as long as people can agree on a common purpose and interest, people of different ethnic, racial, religious, economic and ideological backgrounds can work together efficiently.

For years, the Turkish political system has been marred by petty quarrels and continuous confrontations. It seems that there is an inherent inability in Turkish politician to handle teamwork. Power tends to be concentrated in the hands of the few at the local community level, political party level and national government level. This excessive concentration of power overwhelms those who hold it and frustrate those who aspire to it but cannot achieve it. For example, the pre-eminence of the centre-right political parties in Turkish electoral politics in the last four decades, and the concentration of power in the hands of a few leaders in these political parties have led to three unfortuante consequences. Turkish intellectuals who identified with the left have not taken part in decision making at the national level for years, resulting in a tremendous waste of talent. The decades-long supremacy of the centre-right parties have made them complacent and have rendered them devoid of any intellectual achievements. Finally, the concentration at the hands of the few transformed the Turkish political system into a mindless race to reach the top at any cost. If the political system could move into a new state in which responsibilities are divided among more people, more work would get done at each level and more talented people would be content and productively employed.

We can generalize the argument to the political and civic organizations as a whole. One of the first things that foreigners notice upon arriving in Turkey is that 'monopolization' is one of the central themes in Turkish life. Every individual believes in his ability to discover and implement the 'best way' for the well-being of everybody around him, starting from his family members and expanding into his neighborhood, business community or province, even his soccer team. Each political party claims to have the sole answer to salvation and each community claims to have the best lifestyle. Because of this, the time and energy of the population is spent arguing about what is best for the whole, rather than self-improvement.
Obviously, there are many political views competing to define the Turkish identity and the Turkish role in the world. The 'Westernized' cherish the connection of Turkey to the developed world while the 'Islamists' would like to reinforce the ties between Turkey and the Muslim Middle East. The 'New Nationalists' look towards Central Asia to resuscitate the relationship with distant kin as the 'New Ottomans' envision a role for Turkey in Eastern Europe. It must be noted that all of these are valid and worthy goals. The idea that needs to be digested is that these visions are not mutually exclusive. The integration of Turkey to Europe does not need to result in Turkey distancing herself from the Middle East and there is no reason why Turkey cannot improve her relations with the United States, Russia, Japan and Central Asia all at once. It should be remembered that the most successful long term strategy in diplomacy is to be closer to the other players than they are closer to each other. This strategy, implemented elegantly by Imperial England as well as Bismarck's Germany has the approval stamp of history.

Turkey has had intimate political, economic and social relationships with the West for hundreds of years. The day Mehmed the Second conquered Istanbul and officially crowned himself as "Roman Emperor" the Turkish state made its choice of becoming an integral part of the Europe. While it is true that the quality of the relationship between Turkey and the West leaves much to be desired, attempting to drift away from Europe can only make matters worse. Turkey's challenge is to define its relationship with the West in her own terms rather than becoming a passive partner. We have much to learn from the accomplishments of the West but at the same time we have much to teach. Japan's relationship with the West offers Turkey valuable lessons. Just as Japan adopted many European and American institutions, it has finally penetrated the Western culture in a permanent way. From classical music to performing arts, from industrial development to sports, from community values to poetry, Japan has forced the West to accept that it is not alone in the world. The developed countries have accepted that the concept 'cultural pluralism' has to be extended to include respect for the different values held by the East Asians. Turkey has to follow a similar path, essentially cooperating with and rebelling against the West at the same time. However, Turkey has to integrate with the West more in the political and economic arena but challenge the world in the cultural and intellectual fronts rather than the opposite. The quest for pluralism is not limited to the borders of Turkey.

Turkey's relationships with the East are the mirror image of its relationships with the West. The Turkish mind is as confused about its ties to the East as its ties to the West. It is wrong to deny that Turkey is a part of Asia and the Middle East, just as it is wrong to deny that Turkey is a part of Europe. We share a lot of characteristics with our Islamic neighbors as well as our Central Asian kin.

The bitterness created by the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire and the division of the world into two by the Iron Curtain left Turkey almost isolated from its neighbors. It is interesting that many Turks are well versed in English, French, German and even Italian but not Arabic, Serbo-Croat, Greek, Russian or Persian. The new world order of the 1990s intensified Turkey's relationships with its neighbors in an unprecedented way. Now Turkey's foreign policy has to deal with one-on-one relationships with Iran, Iraq, Syria and Armenia rather than the global capitalist-communist struggle. The issue of pluralism faces in this area as well. All Turks have to get used to the fact that we are living in a volatile region with many independent and conflicting interests. The new puzzle facing Turkey is how to construct a balancing act to ensure peaceful and productive co-habitation with a diverse set of neighbors.

The viability of any long term political strategy is vitally dependent on the economic directions that accompany it. Naturally, a political action plan to resolve some of Turkey's internal ills and to redefine Turkey's role in the world has to have a simultaneous economic counterpart. Just as in the case of politics, the principle of pluralism can provide a very useful guideline in drawing economic policy.

As we approach the 21st century, Turkey is an increasingly heterogenous society. Perhaps this was so two hundred years ago, but the inevitable wave of Turkish nationalism of the early century (which was a response to the nationalism of the countries around it) and the pro-American cold war strategy after World War II have left this fact in the shadows for quite some time. In fact, due to the circumstances of the world, Turkish decision makers had no choice but try to impose homogenization on the people. However, things have changed, and it is time to review this paradigm.

Turkey, just as any large country, is a melting-pot of competing economic interests. As an economic entity experiencing the industrial revolution and the information revolution at once, it is fragmented into fairly small economic groupings. However, the large and organized social classes of Europe do not exist in Turkey as Turkey did not fully experience the industrial revolution or the accompanying social struggles.

Two general classes of economic systems are observed around the world. Individualist 'Laissez-faire' models advocate the importance of competition, pointing out that it yields innovation and improvement. Collectivist models (including the totalitarian communist regimes, corporatist fascist regimes, democratic socialist models and the state-dominated capitalist East Asian systems) are based on taking advantage of the speed and focus that is made possible under centralization and authoritarianism. In general, it has been observed that advanced countries that need to develop new technologies to keep ahead will benefit from competition while developing countries that need to 'catch up' need to concentrate on discipline and cohesion. However, Turkey's case is probably an exception to this statement. Although Turkey's economic paradigm is to 'catch-up' with the advanced world and to import technology rather than to create new technology, the only development path open to Turkey is an individualist and pluralist one. The public institutions in Turkey have been overrun by irresponsible elected politicians. Instead of providing the right conditions for economic growth and improving the well-being of the underprivileged among its citizens, the Turkish government has become a tool to disturb the income distribution unfairly by giving away hard-earned public money to the supporters of political parties. The state apparatus have become so inefficient and out of date that there is no point trying to salvage it in its current state. The time and effort required to correct the state institutions would be better spent in an individualistic development push. The government can potentially play a valuable role in the socio-economic development of a country, but given the total corruption and incompetence of the political process in Turkey, it would be an illusion to attach such hopes to the government at the present time.

On the other hand, the Turkish private sector, especially in Istanbul, has become a breeding ground for entrepreneurship in recent years. Turkish citizens have become increasingly able to formulate creative solutions to economic problems they are facing. The Turkish economy has opened up to the world substantially and while maintaining a long run growth rate of around 5%. It should be pointed out that the economic developments in Turkey have occurred despite the lack of government guidance, the inflow of foreign capital and heavy investments. Turkish businessmen and workers have done quite well against the challenges presented to them. If they have performed so successfully in the presence of a government seriously hampering them, imagine what they can achieve in a state where they are set free of their burden. Over the last ten years, individual entrepreneurs in Turkey have proven that they can replace and outperform the central government as the main driving force of the economy. Therefore, the choice of economic model in Turkey has become a practical and implementation-efficiency related issue rather than an ideological issue. Whether one is a collectivist or an individualist is not relevant right now. The government institutions in Turkey has been weakened and drained to a point where they are unable to fulfill an efficient role in providing direction to the economy. The government apparatus has become a tool that upsets income distribution in favor of the memebers of the parties who win elections. The only fast solution to this problem is to distribute all government property as equitably as possibe between private citizens and simultaneously, to reduce the power of the central government over the lives of people. The lesson that comes of two centuries of democratic capitalism around the world is that a successful government is not a big or all-powerful government but an efficient and competent government.

To sum up:
· Major trends in the world socio-economic system are leading to economic integration and political disintegration simultaneously
· The changes in world politics are forcing to take turkey a more active role in the region
· The only way to achieve an active foreign policy is a strong economy and consensus at home
· The combined aim of reaching a philosophical consensus, getting the economy moving and creating a working political system is only achievable by a major paradigm shift
· The essential component of the prescribed paradigm shift is to rediscover pluralism
· Pluralism has significant consequences in foreign policy, economic organization, political organization and philosophy